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29.1 Introduction 
In recent years, research into the impact of genetic abnormalities on cognitive development, 
including language, has become recognised for its potential to make valuable contributions to 
our understanding of the brain-behaviour relationships underlying language acquisition as 
well as understanding the cognitive architecture of the human mind. The publication of 
Fodor’s (1983) book The Modularity of Mind has had a profound impact on the study of 
language and the cognitive architecture of the human mind. Its central claim is that many of 
the processes involved in comprehension are undertaken by special brain systems termed 
‘modules’. This domain specificity of language or modularity has become a fundamental 
feature that differentiates competing theories and accounts of language acquisition (Fodor 
1983, 1985; Levy 1994; Karmiloff-Smith 1998).  
 
However, although the fact that the adult brain is modularised is hardly disputed, there are 
different views of how brain regions become specialised for specific functions. A question of 
some interest to theorists is whether the human brain is modularised from the outset (nativist 
view) or whether these distinct brain regions develop as a result of biological maturation and 
environmental input (neuroconstructivist view). One source of insight into these issues has 
been the study of developmental disorders, and in particular genetic syndromes, such as 
Williams syndrome (WS) and Down’s syndrome (DS). Because of their uneven profiles 
characterised by dissociations of different cognitive skills, these syndromes can help us 
address theoretically significant questions. Investigations into the linguistic and cognitive 
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profiles of individuals with these genetic abnormalities have been used as evidence to 
advance theoretical views about innate modularity and the cognitive architecture of the 
human mind. 
 
The present chapter will be organised as follows. To begin, two different theoretical 
proposals in the modularity debate will be presented. Then studies of linguistic abilities in 
WS and in DS will be reviewed. Here, the emphasis will be mainly on WS due to the fact that 
theoretical debates have focused primarily on WS, there is a larger body of literature on WS, 
and DS subjects have typically been used for the purposes of comparison. Finally, the 
modularity debate will be revisited in light of the literature review of both WS and DS. 
Conclusions will be drawn regarding the contribution of these two genetic syndromes to the 
issue of cognitive modularity, and in particular innate modularity.  
 
29.2 Nativist approach to language acquisition and cognitive architecture 
The first half of the 20
th
 century was dominated by a behaviourist view of language 
acquisition. According to this view, linguistic abilities are acquired in childhood as a result of 
training provided by the members of the child’s immediate linguistic environment. Skinner 
(1957), the main proponent of behaviourism, proposed that language is just another behaviour 
which can be acquired through explicit teaching and reinforcement.   
 
In an attempt to reject behaviourist explanations of language acquisition, Noam Chomsky 
launched in the late 1950s what has become known as a ‘nativist’ revolution. The adherents 
of the nativist tradition oppose the behaviourist’s simplistic and rather mechanical way of 
explaining language acquisition. They propose instead that a generative grammar is to be 
taken as a starting point for explaining language acquisition. A generative grammar is a set of 
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rules or procedures which allow one to generate all and only the grammatical sentences in a 
language, characterise all the sentences which already exist in the language corpus and 
predict the existence and properties of new sentences (Chomsky 1965). 
 
Another crucial aspect of nativist theories with regard to the organisation of human cognitive 
architecture is the assumption that the human mind is modular and that language is a separate, 
independent module. This idea has been clearly articulated by Jerry Fodor. Fodor (1983) 
argued that many of the processes involved in the comprehension of language are undertaken 
by specialized brain systems termed ‘modules’. This domain specificity of language or 
modularity has become a fundamental feature that differentiates competing linguistic theories 
and accounts of language acquisition (Fodor 1983, 1985; Bates et al. 1988, 1995). Fodor 
argues for a distinction between a central system responsible for rational thought and the 
fixation of belief, and a number of modular input systems which deliver input into the central 
system. The theory posits that while cognitive processes, such as long-term memory and 
problem-solving are carried out by non-modular, relatively slow, central processes, input 
systems such as those involved in perception are modular in nature. The language faculty is 
viewed as an input system on a par with the senses, such as vision.  
 
Fodor’s main examples of modules are language comprehension and visual perception. Fodor 
(1983: 98) points out that ‘the key to modularity is informational encapsulation’. 
Informational encapsulation describes the feature of modules whereby they only have access 
to information of a certain type. A visual perception module, for example, only has access to 
visual perceptual data. Other characteristics of modules, such as domain specificity, shallow 
output, neural localisation, etc. may be present, but they are not crucial. Given that modules 
are informationally encapsulated, one would expect there to be minimal interference in the 
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event of breakdown. So, for example, difficulties in the visuo-spatial domain should not 
affect comprehension of syntactic structures. In order to test this hypothesis, one inevitably 
needs to refer to atypical populations which present with breakdowns of different cognitive 
functions resulting in cognitive dissociations.  
 
As mentioned above, a commonly assumed approach to language acquisition within the 
nativist view is represented by generative grammar. According to proponents of generative 
grammar, children’s knowledge of morphosyntax and possibly phonology consists of 
knowledge of formal rules or operations (Ambridge and Lieven 2011). A large body of 
literature on language acquisition has emerged within the nativist and generativist 
frameworks (for a review of studies, see Ambridge and Lieven 2011). Discussion of this 
literature on typical language acquisition is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, it is 
worth pointing out that dissociations between language and other cognitive skills, such as is 
often found in atypical populations, have been used by nativist theorists as evidence in 
support of an innate language (or more often, ‘syntax’) module. Evidence of this type will be 
presented in a discussion of Williams syndrome in section 29.5 below. 
 
In addition, there have been some theoretical developments within the nativist view since the 
publication of Fodor’s landmark book in 1983. Evolutionary psychologists have proposed 
what is known as the massive modularity hypothesis (Machery 2011). According to this 
hypothesis, human cognitive architecture is built from a number of different systems and 
most of these systems are believed to be adaptations selected for specific purposes (Machery 
2011). Unlike Fodorian modularity, this hypothesis does not propose informational 
encapsulation of the different systems. Importantly, it does not say anything about whether 
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the different systems are specified from birth and it proposes that development involves an 
interaction between the genome and the environment.  
 
Evidence in support of the massive modularity hypothesis should come from developmental 
disorders. This is because developmental disorders often show dissociations between 
different cognitive skills, dissociations which are assumed to provide support for distinct 
components in human cognitive architecture (Machery 2011). The massive modularity 
hypothesis also proposes that the component parts of the human cognitive system are 
adaptations. The question of how the massive modularity hypothesis can provide evidence 
that these components are adaptations is still to be answered. However, the answer is to be 
sought in developmental disorders. This is because dissociations found in developmental 
disorders will need to show how specific systems fulfil specific functions and only these 
functions. For the time being, the evidence is not very strong (see discussion of Clahsen and 
Almazan’s (1998) work on WS in section 29.5).  
 
29.3 Neuroconstructivist approach 
In the 1970s, a second stream of thought regarding language acquisition was derived largely 
from the work of Jean Piaget. Even though it seemed that this stream would be some kind of 
continuation of the empiricist thinking of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries, this was not quite the 
case, as Piaget (1980: 23-4) explicitly acknowledged: 
  
‘The critique of empiricism is not tantamount to negating the role of 
experimentation, but the “empirical” study of the genesis of knowledge shows 
from the onset the insufficiency of an “empiricist” interpretation of experience. In 
fact, no knowledge is based on perceptions alone, for these are always directed, 
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and accompanied by schemes of action. Knowledge, therefore, proceeds from 
action, and all action that is repeated or generalised through application to new 
objects engenders by this very fact a “scheme”, that is, a kind of practical 
concept’. 
 
This quotation from the Piaget-Chomsky debate suggests that although Piaget does not fully 
discard the role of experience in knowledge acquisition, he emphasises the necessity of the 
human subject having an important role in structuring activity. Thus, knowledge is supposed 
to proceed from action, or what Piaget terms ‘assimilation’ of objects to the schemes of the 
subject. What is the relevance of such a proposal to language acquisition?  
 
According to Piaget, language is facilitated by the development of sensory-motor schemas 
that represent the joint outcomes of perception and action. Sensory-motor schemas undergo 
orderly changes which are nourished, but not shaped by, continuing experience in acting on 
the world. This means that the child will be able to separate thought from action in her 
schemas in due course, and her concepts of objects and events in the world will become 
independent of the actions to be performed on them. Thus, in order for the infant who is 
acquiring language to be able to make linguistic distinctions such as Object and Action (i.e. 
NP and VP), she needs to acquire the concept that Object is independent of Action.  
 
For Piaget, language is a manifestation of intelligence and is, hence, not dissociable from it. It 
is also argued that certain cognitive prerequisites are necessary for the acquisition of 
language. The idea is that normal development of language is parasitic on the prior mental 
development of such abilities as ‘seriation’ and ‘conservation’. In order to acquire linguistic 
structures such as correct word order or the passive, children are supposed to have reached a 
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level of cognitive development at which they could carry out tasks such as putting items in 
ascending order of size (seriation), or judging that the amount of liquid poured from a tall 
thin glass into a short one remained the same (conservation).  
 
Thinking has moved on from the time when Piaget first proposed his view of language 
acquisition. Although some of Piaget’s fundamental principles are still very much present, 
there have been a number of theoretical developments. For example, there is a large body of 
literature which addresses the issue of cognitive precursors to language acquisition. The very 
concept of cognitive precursors or prerequisites suggests that it is taken for granted that 
language acquisition is dependent upon the development of other cognitive skills. These 
skills include speech segmentation (Newman et al. 2006) and joint attention (Morales et al. 
1998, 2000; Markus et al. 2000), amongst others.  
 
Pertinent to the current chapter are challenges to the innateness of modularity, and the 
proposal that modularity is a product of development (Karmiloff-Smith 1994, 1998). This 
viewpoint recognises the existence of innate biological constraints on language acquisition 
but it considers these constraints to be not so detailed and less domain-specific as far as 
higher-level cognitive functions such as language are concerned. Development is seen as 
playing a crucial role in shaping phenotypical outcomes and the protracted period of post-
natal growth is seen as essential in influencing the resulting domain specificity of the 
developing neocortex (Karmiloff-Smith 1998). As with the nativist view, it is difficult to test 
the idea that language acquisition is an inseparable part of general cognitive development, 
because in typically developing children different cognitive abilities develop in synchrony 
with each other. Assuming this theoretical approach, a child with developmental disorders 
would be expected to show language acquisition in line with their general cognitive abilities.  
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29.4 Genetic syndromes 
Over the past four decades, language breakdown and atypical linguistic and cognitive 
development have played a very important role in the ongoing debate on modularity. In 
particular, genetic syndromes have played a major role in this debate. A ‘syndrome’ is 
defined as the presence of multiple anomalies in the same individual with all of those 
anomalies having a single cause. So far, over 300 different genetic syndromes have been 
identified (Shprintzen 1997). Populations affected by genetic syndromes have been studied 
for different reasons. One strong motivation is to gain knowledge about the behavioural 
manifestations of a specific genetic abnormality, with a view to having a better understanding 
of the condition and informing diagnosis and remediation. Another reason for studying 
genetic syndromes is the potential contribution that they can make to theoretical debates on 
the role of general cognitive mechanisms for language acquisition. Developmental disorders 
provide a naturalistic way of testing the relation between the biological (and psychological) 
basis of language and the biological (and psychological) basis of other cognitive or neural 
systems (Marcus and Rabagliati 2006).  
 
Two syndromes which have attracted more interest than others are Williams syndrome (WS) 
and Down’s syndrome (DS). There are a number of reasons for this. The foremost reason is 
the fact that affected individuals present with uneven, and qualitatively different, profiles of 
cognitive abilities within the context of similar IQ levels (~40 to 60; Udwin and Yule 1991; 
Roizen 2002). In DS, relatively good visuo-spatial abilities contrast with poor expressive 
language skills (Fowler et al. 1994; Rondal and Comblain 1996; Chapman et al. 1998; Klein 
and Mervis 1999; Jarrold et al. 2002; Laws 2002). Individuals with WS display relatively 
good expressive language abilities and poor visuo-spatial abilities (Bellugi et al. 1994; Grant 
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et al. 1997; Howlin et al. 1998). Within the context of language abilities, the two populations 
also show uneven profiles. Syntactic abilities are a relative weakness in DS but a relative 
strength in WS (Bellugi et al. 2000). Expressive prosodic skills, which are a relative 
weakness in DS (Pettinato and Verhoeven 2009; Stojanovik 2011), are relatively unimpaired 
in WS as they are in line with level of language comprehension (Stojanovik et al. 2007). 
Finally, pragmatic aspects of language are impaired in the context of WS (Laws and Bishop 
2004; Stojanovik 2006), but are a relative strength for those with DS (Laws and Bishop 
2004). Each of these syndromes will be reviewed separately below. 
 
29.4.1 Williams syndrome 
Williams syndrome is a relatively rare genetic condition which was first identified in 1961 by 
Williams and his colleagues in New Zealand (Williams et al. 1961). They labelled the 
syndrome following a clinical study of four patients with mental retardation and a peculiar 
facial appearance. WS occurs in one of 15,000-20,000 live births, although a study in Norway 
suggested an incidence rate of 1 in 7,500 (Strømme et al. 2002). WS results from a micro-
deletion of one copy of about 20 contiguous genes in chromosome 7, affecting one of the 
alleles of the elastin gene (Frangistakis et al. 1996; Korenberg et al. 2000). Molecular genetic 
testing by means of fluorescence in situ hybridisation (or FISH) can now be used to confirm 
the deletion of one copy of the elastin gene and other surrounding genes in a small region of 
chromosome 7 at 7q11.23. WS is characterised by a range of moderate to severe physical 
abnormalities, including elevated blood calcium levels, high blood pressure, failure to thrive 
in infancy and abnormal sensitivity to certain classes of sounds (hyperacusis). 
 
On the level of brain organisation, WS typically presents with no evidence of focal lesions. 
Given that approximately 22 out of the 28 genes within the WS critical region are thought to 
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be expressed in the brain, it is very likely that brain development in WS differs from typical 
development (Karmiloff-Smith 2011). There have been few studies of the WS brain during 
development (i.e. childhood) and most of what we know about brain structure in WS comes 
from adult studies. Brain volume in WS reaches about 80% of normal brain volume (Chiang 
et al. 2007) and there is increased cortical thickness (Thompson et al. 2005). The frontal 
lobes, superior temporal gyrus, amygdala, fusiform gyrus and cerebellum in WS adult brains 
are relatively preserved whereas the parietal and occipital lobes, the thalamus, the basal 
ganglia and the midbrain are smaller in volume (Karmiloff-Smith 2011). An interesting 
finding is that the amygdala and the cerebellum are larger than the rest of the WS brain and a 
large cerebellum has been shown to be present in early childhood (Jones et al. 2002).  
 
Although WS was first identified in the 1960s, it was not until about two decades later that it 
started attracting increasing interest from researchers. The most striking phenomenon linked 
to the syndrome was the reported uneven cognitive-linguistic profile. This profile includes 
moderate to severe learning difficulties, impairments in planning, problem solving and spatial 
cognition alongside relative strengths in social cognition, linguistic abilities, face processing 
and auditory rote memory (Mervis and Klein-Tasman 2000). Despite the fact that 
performance IQ is around 50 on average for people with WS, the general view is that 
linguistic abilities are a relative strength. However, this view has been seriously challenged in 
recent years.  
 
Early studies on Williams syndrome (1970s and 1980s): 
Early studies of WS were typically multi-dimensional investigations which incorporated 
behavioural, medical, physiological, cognitive and linguistic aspects of the WS profile. These 
studies provided a rather broad picture of the WS phenotype. However, they suggested the 
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existence of possible dissociations in the WS profile. For example, Von Arnim and Engel 
(1964) described the profiles of four individuals with WS who were aged 5 to 15 years. The 
IQs of these children ranged from 43 to 56. They had physical growth problems, poor motor 
coordination, outgoing personalities, recurrent signs of unreasonable anxiety, and an unusual 
command of language. Von Arnim and Engel (1964: 375) stated that ‘[t]heir loquacity 
combined with friendliness and a great ability to make interpersonal contacts makes them 
appear brighter and more intelligent than in fact they are’. A decade later, Jones and Smith 
(1975) presented evaluation data on 14 children and adults with WS between the ages of 3 
months to 23 years. The children were reported to have full IQ scores which ranged between 
41 to 80 and a mean IQ of 56. This study also makes special mention of linguistic abilities in 
WS, but with not much elaboration. The personality of individuals with WS was described as 
‘friendly, loquacious, and cocktail party manner’ (Jones and Smith 1975: 719).   
 
It was not until 1978 that the first attempt was made to systematically quantify data on 
individuals with WS. Bennett et al. (1978) studied seven children with WS who were 4:06-
8:05 years of age. The children had mild to moderate learning difficulties as revealed by 
scores (range 30-81, mean IQ 53.9) on the McCarthy Scales of Children’s Abilities 
(McCarthy 1972). All seven children performed better on measures of verbal ability than on 
fine motor and gross motor measures. Bennett et al. concluded that verbal abilities in WS 
were superior in the face of impaired motor skills and cognitive deficits. Thus, a debate was 
begun which remains unresolved as yet. 
 
A number of studies investigating linguistic abilities in WS followed throughout the 1980s. 
As the research base started to grow so too did the controversy regarding ‘superior’ language 
skills in WS. Kataria et al. (1984) did not find evidence of superior verbal skills over motor 
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abilities. Nor did they find evidence of an ‘unusual command of language’ (previously 
considered to be a marker of the syndrome). Arnold et al. (1985) found no difference in the 
performance of children with WS on the verbal and non-verbal subtests of the Wechsler’s 
Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC; Wechsler 1976). Furthermore, on the Reynell 
Developmental Language Scale (Reynell 1977), the language skills of only three children 
exceeded the seven-year ceiling of the test, while those of the remainder ranged from three to 
seven years. Most children, though, were able to produce and respond to simple sentences.  
 
Pagon et al. (1987) also administered the WISC to a group of individuals with WS. Seven of 
the group scored above the floor of the verbal scale, and had verbal IQs of between 47 and 
85. Five of these individuals also scored above the floor on the performance scale and their 
performance IQs were between 45 and 69. These differences were non-significant. Only one 
individual with a high verbal IQ score showed a verbal advantage. Similarly, Crisco et al. 
(1988) found no significant verbal advantage on the Illinois Test of Psycholinguistic Abilities 
(Kirk et al. 1968) for a group of children with WS when matched on mental age with another 
group of children with non-specific developmental disabilities. However, they did observe 
significantly poorer performance for the WS group in comparison to the control group on 
visual reception, visual closure and visual memory. No verbal advantage on the WISC was 
reported by Dall’Oglio and Milani (1995) and Greer et al. (1997) on the Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence Scale.  
 
Unlike the studies mentioned above, significant differences between verbal and performance 
IQ were reported in a series of papers by Udwin and colleagues (Udwin et al. 1986, 1987; 
Udwin and Yule 1990, 1991). These four papers give details from a single, large group of 44 
individuals with infantile hypercalcaemia (former label for WS) aged between 6;0 and 15;09 
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years who were administered the WISC. A number of participants scored below floor on the 
verbal and performance scales. But verbal IQs for the remaining participants ranged between 
45 and 109 (mean = 62.4), while performance IQs ranged between 45 and 73 (mean = 55.9). 
This suggests a verbal advantage for the majority of the participants albeit a fairly marginal 
one.  
 
In summary, the majority of studies which have used IQ measures with the WS population 
have found no significant differences between their verbal and non-verbal profiles. The 
exceptions are Udwin and Yule (1990, 1991) and Udwin et al. (1986, 1987) who reported a 
marginal verbal advantage. The problem with using IQ measures for the purposes of 
investigating verbal and non-verbal skills is that the verbal part of both the WISC and the 
Stanford-Binet scales requires the use of metalinguistic skills and knowledge of social 
situations. Both scales examine knowledge of vocabulary by asking the participant to provide 
a definition (a metalinguistic skill) as opposed to, for example, only asking the participant to 
name a picture. Also, both scales have a comprehension sub-part which requires practical 
problem solving and social information. It has been widely documented across studies that 
individuals with WS have difficulties with problem solving tasks (Bellugi et al. 1988, 1989, 
1994).  
 
More recent studies on Williams syndrome (from 1990s to present day): 
From the 1990s onwards, research into WS became more systematic. Researchers started 
investigating various levels of language including phonology, morphosyntax, lexical 
semantics and pragmatics. Each of these levels will be reviewed in this section. Some studies 
argued that each of these areas of linguistic functioning is somewhat ‘spared’ or is a relative 
strength in WS. A series of studies from the Bellugi group mainly involving older children 
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and young adults with WS suggested that individuals with WS have ‘spared’ or ‘preserved’ 
syntactic abilities (Bellugi et al. 1988, 1994, 1999). The evidence came from individuals with 
WS whose comprehension of complex syntactic structures such as reversible passives, 
negative clauses and conditionals was better than that of age- and IQ-matched individuals 
with DS. Also, individuals with WS were reported to be better than age- and IQ-matched 
individuals with DS at detecting syntactic anomalies and correcting ungrammatical sentences.  
 
A study by Clahsen and Almazan (1998) also reported that individuals with WS are able to 
comprehend reversible passives, regular past-tense morphology and reflexive anaphors. A 
recent study by Musolino et al. (2010) argued that individuals with WS are able to understand 
core syntactic and semantic relations. These authors claimed that ‘knowledge of core, abstract 
principles of grammar is present and engaged in WS’ (Musolino et al. 2010: 53). 
Performance on regular as opposed to irregular morphology has been shown to be a relative 
strength for individuals with WS in different languages (Pleh et al. 2003; Clahsen et al. 
2004). However, individuals with WS have never been shown to outperform mental age 
controls.  
 
The study by Clahsen and Almazan (1998) has been referred to as an example of how a 
genetic disorder such as WS can support the massive modularity hypothesis. This is because 
the study revealed a dissociation between regular and irregular morphology, suggesting the 
existence of two systems: a computational system which involves the application of syntactic 
rules (such as ‘add -ed to regular verbs’), and a lexical system responsible for lexical 
knowledge. Importantly, however, when Thomas et al. (2001) employed a developmental 
trajectory approach and controlled for mental age when analysing data from the performance 
on regular versus irregular morphology, they did not find an effect of regularity on 
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performance in the WS group. This throws into question the original claim that children with 
WS are better at regular than irregular inflectional morphology. This, in turn, raises doubts 
about the existence of two separate computational and lexical systems. 
 
There is no evidence in the research corpus so far to show that individuals with WS perform 
better than expected for their level of non-verbal ability on morphosyntactic tasks. In fact, 
some studies have even shown that children with WS perform below levels expected for their 
non-verbal mental age. For example, Joffe and Varlocosta (2007) reported that participants 
with WS performed significantly worse than mental age matched controls on a task requiring 
them to repeat wh-questions and also on a standardised test of grammar, the Test of the 
Reception of Grammar (Bishop 2003).  
 
With regard to lexical abilities in WS, one striking finding that has emerged from the existent 
literature is the relative strength in receptive vocabulary. Receptive vocabulary is one 
language domain in which individuals with WS tend to score better than might be predicted 
by their mental age (Bellugi et al. 1988; Rossen et al. 1996; Clahsen et al. 2004). This 
relative strength seems to hold for concrete rather than conceptual/relational vocabulary 
(Mervis and John 2008). There has been debate as to whether individuals with WS have 
atypical semantic organisation. Some studies have shown that naming, when accurate, is 
faster in individuals with WS than mental age controls (Temple et al. 2002). Ypsilanti et al. 
(2005) reported atypical responses by individuals with WS on a word definition task. 
However, Tyler et al. (1997) did not find any different priming effects of category structure 
and functional relations in an online task in individuals with WS compared to controls, 
suggesting that semantic organisation was not atypical.  
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Studies have also shown that individuals with WS may show delayed semantic development. 
For example, individuals with WS showed frequency and semantic category effects in a 
speeded picture-naming task which were in line with their receptive language skills (Thomas 
et al. 2006). Although some early research pointed out that individuals with WS may 
sometimes use rare and low-frequency vocabulary (Bellugi et al. 1992), which was taken as 
evidence that lexical semantics may be independent of general cognitive abilities (Bellugi et 
al. 2000), such findings have not been replicated. For example, Jarrold et al. (2000) reported 
that individuals with WS did not produce more novel items in a semantic fluency task than a 
control group of individuals with learning difficulties matched on receptive vocabulary. More 
recently, Stojanovik and van Ewijk (2008) showed that, when the conversational context was 
controlled for, children with WS did not produce more low-frequency words than controls 
matched for language age, non-verbal mental age and chronological age. 
 
Phonological abilities in WS have perhaps attracted least attention. This is possibly due to the 
fact that individuals with WS, unlike those with DS, have intelligible speech by and large. 
Suprasegmental features have attracted more interest. A seminal study by Reilly et al. (1990), 
which included only four participants with WS, reported that individuals with WS have 
expressive prosody which is over-rich in affect intonation. Abnormally high pitch range, 
which results in individuals with WS being perceived as twice as emotionally involved as 
children of a similar language and chronological age, was confirmed in a larger study by 
Setter et al. (2007).  
 
Research involving a developmental trajectory approach to data analysis showed that children 
and teenagers with Williams syndrome show a delayed onset (relative to chronological age) 
in the development of some prosodic skills, such as the ability to use prosody to signal which 
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is the most important word in a phrase (Stojanovik 2010). This same study demonstrated a 
delayed rate of development in the ability to use prosody to achieve the disambiguation of 
potentially ambiguous phrases and to produce questioning versus declarative intonation 
(Stojanovik 2010). In addition, children with WS have different prosodic profiles from 
children with DS despite having similar levels of receptive language and non-verbal abilities. 
In particular, children with WS were significantly better than children with DS at perceiving 
and producing affect and questioning versus declarative intonation (Stojanovik 2010). This 
cross-syndrome difference is interesting as it suggests some syndrome-specific characteristic 
and has implications for how we evaluate the evidence that genetic syndromes provide for 
innate modularity. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the conclusions of the 
chapter.  
 
Last but not least, we need to mention pragmatic abilities in WS. Early studies of WS 
reported relative strengths in the domain of communication skills in WS. For example, Reilly 
et al. (1990) characterised individuals with WS as being ‘highly social’ and as ‘having 
remarkable social understanding’. A series of studies by Jones et al. (2000) reported that 
individuals with WS used a greater number of descriptions of affective states and evaluative 
comments during an interview task. They also included more inferences about the affective 
state and motivation of story characters than children with DS or typically developing 
children.  
 
However, other studies have shown that individuals with WS use more stereotyped 
conversation than children with DS or specific language impairment (Laws and Bishop 2004) 
and have difficulties with establishing social relationships and making friends (Davies et al. 
1998). Social interaction deficits, and specifically difficulties with exchange structure, 
18 
 
responding appropriately to interlocutor’s requests for information and clarification, 
interpreting meaning and providing enough information for the conversational partner were 
reported by Stojanovik (2006). Individuals with WS also have difficulties with the 
understanding of idiomatic expressions (Mervis et al. 2003) and figurative language, in 
particular lexicalised metaphor comprehension, which was reported to be lower than expected 
for receptive language abilities (Annaz et al. 2009).   
 
29.4.2 Down’s syndrome 
DS is the most common genetic cause of developmental delay (Martin et al. 2009). It results 
from extra genetic material on chromosome 21 (Rondal and Edwards 1997). The majority of 
cases (about 95%) are caused by complete duplication of chromosome 21. The remainder of 
cases are caused either by translocation of material from chromosome 21 to another 
chromosome, typically 13 or 18 (4%), or mosaicism (i.e. a mixture of trisomy and unaffected 
cells) (1%) (Baum et al. 2008). A person of any race, socioeconomic status, or geographic 
location can have a child with DS, and the only aetiological factor definitely linked to DS is 
increasing maternal age (Hassold and Sherman 2002). DS has an incidence of 1 in 1,000 
(Down’s Syndrome Association 2012). The syndrome is characterised by a range of 
physiological and anatomical anomalies. Individuals with DS often have characteristic facial 
features due to midfacial hypoplasia. These include a flat broad face, flat nasal bridge, and a 
flat facial profile (Baum et al. 2008). Physical features such as short stature, hypotonia and 
hyperflexibility of the joints are also present (Baum et al. 2008).  
 
At the level of brain organisation, some anomalies have been reported. For example, 
individuals with DS seem to present a right cerebral hemisphere lateralisation for receptive 
language and a left cerebral hemisphere lateralisation for production of simple and complex 
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movements (Heath et al. 2007). A study by Shoji et al. (2009) has also reported atypical 
linguistic lateralisation in a dichotic listening task in which individuals with DS showed a left 
ear advantage when presented with words with two consonant-vowel syllables. This is a 
different pattern to that seen in the neuro-typical brain, where language processing typically 
occurs in the left hemisphere. This has been supported by hand-preference studies (which are 
believed to be a marker of functional hemispheric specialisation). For instance, children with 
DS were found to show weaker hand preference than typically developing children (Groen et 
al. 2008).  
 
The linguistic and cognitive profile of individuals with DS is often characterised as ‘uneven’. 
There are weaknesses in auditory short-term memory relative to visual short-term memory 
and other aspects of cognition (Chapman 2003), and strengths in social functioning abilities 
(Kasari and Bauminger 1998). Children with DS are slow to acquire language. General 
language performance in individuals with DS tends to be lower than expected from their level 
of cognitive development (Fowler et al. 1994; Chapman and Hesketh 2000; Vicari et al. 
2000; Perovic 2001, 2002). Exceptionally, language abilities may in some cases be higher 
than other cognitive abilities (Rondal 1994), but such cases are rare.  
 
Vocabulary knowledge seems to be stronger than grammatical abilities (Chapman et al. 1991; 
Miller 1996). Many children with DS do not acquire their first words before the age of 2 
years (Rondal 2001). However, early lexical development generally shows a positive linear 
relationship with mental age (Rondal and Edwards 1997). Receptive vocabulary has also 
been reported to be in line with mental age (Laws and Bishop 2003). Although vocabulary is 
a relative strength in the language profile of the DS population, there is individual variation. 
In a study of 43 children with DS, Miller (1999) reported that 65% scored below their mental 
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age on vocabulary and 35% had vocabulary scores consistent with their mental age on the 
MacArthur Communicative Development Inventories (Fenson et al. 1993). Jarrold et al. 
(2002) also reported that children and adults with DS often have receptive vocabulary deficits 
compared to typically developing individuals matched for mental age.  
 
Morphosyntactic abilities in children with DS are a relative weakness. Eadie et al. (2002) 
compared the accuracy of marking finiteness in spontaneous speech in children with DS to 
children with specific language impairment. The study found that the profiles of the groups of 
children were similar, suggesting that grammatical abilities in children with DS are 
comparable to those of children with known language impairments. A study by Ring and 
Clahsen (2005) reported that adolescents with DS have marked difficulties with tense 
marking, plural marking and the marking of comparative and superlative on adjectives. 
Interestingly, the participants with DS had equal difficulties with tense and non-tense related 
morphemes, suggesting that the grammatical morpheme difficulties in DS extend beyond the 
finiteness cluster of morphemes.  
 
Phonological abilities in DS have been investigated more frequently than those of individuals 
with WS, due to the fact that individuals with DS have difficulties with producing intelligible 
speech. A study by Cleland et al. (2010) reported that two thirds of a cohort of 15 individuals 
with DS (mean age 14;3 years) had severe speech disorders to the extent that they failed to 
meet the basal age-equivalent of 3;0 years in the Diagnostic Evaluation of Articulation and 
Phonology (Dodd et al. 2002). The most common phonological process evidenced was 
consonant cluster reduction followed by final consonant deletion and initial consonant 
deletion. Prosodic abilities are mainly in line with non-verbal mental age apart from 
production of affective intonation and pre-final narrow focus which seem lower than 
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expected for non-verbal mental age (Stojanovik 2011). In addition, and similar to 
morphosyntactic and lexical skills, prosodic abilities seem better with regard to 
comprehension as opposed to production.  
 
With regard to pragmatic and social communication skills, it has been shown that people with 
DS are very keen to engage in conversation and to keep the conversation going but often lack 
the appropriate language skills to do so (Rondal 2001). Two studies described in Abbeduto 
and Murphy (2004) report relative strengths and weaknesses in the DS communication 
profile. For example, in a barrier task, individuals with DS were less likely than typically 
developing individuals matched for mental age and individuals with fragile X syndrome to 
provide listeners with referential frames which help the listener’s comprehension. Also, 
individuals with DS were less likely than mental age matched controls to signal non-
comprehension. This suggests that they may be unable to monitor their own comprehension 
which can seriously disrupt the flow of conversations. However, individuals with DS were 
found to appreciate shared knowledge in conversational exchanges. They were also able to 
make appropriate shifts from indefinite descriptions such as ‘a house’ to definite descriptions 
such as ‘the house’. 
 
29.5 Critical evaluation of the modularity debate 
As already mentioned in the introduction, comparing linguistic abilities in children with WS 
and those with DS is relevant for addressing theoretical questions about the architecture of 
human cognition. This is because both genetic disorders present with similar levels of non-
verbal IQ, but different linguistic profiles. The literature on linguistic abilities in WS is richer 
than the literature on DS and aspects of linguistic abilities in WS, such as morphosyntactic, 
lexical and pragmatic abilities, have been studied more systematically and in greater detail in 
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WS than in DS. Although it is obvious that there are areas of strengths and weaknesses in 
both genetic disorders, what is also striking is the fact that linguistic abilities in WS rarely, if 
ever, exceed non-verbal abilities. The literature review on WS in section 29.4.1 suggests that 
individuals with WS present with language deficits relative to chronological age, but in line 
with non-verbal mental age (e.g. Thomas et al. 2001; Stojanovik et al. 2004, 2007). 
Interestingly, language abilities in some studies have been shown to be even lower than non-
verbal mental age (Joffe and Varlocosta 2007). This suggests that it is very unlikely that 
linguistic and non-verbal abilities are dissociable. It seems that linguistic abilities (with the 
exception of, perhaps, receptive vocabulary) develop in synchrony with non-verbal skills.  
 
The innate modularity view and, in particular, the massive modularity hypothesis are based 
on the premise that typical cognitive architecture consists of a number of different systems. If 
this view is correct, it is expected that these systems will dissociate in developmental 
disorders. The lack of dissociations found in WS means that one cannot accept the nativist 
view and must accept the alternative neuroconstructivist view. This latter view posits that it is 
impossible for language abilities to exceed an individual’s level of cognitive functioning as 
these abilities are not dissociable from general cognition. Studies which argue that language 
abilities in WS are superior to non-verbal abilities – a claim which supports the nativist view 
– do not have convincing evidence that this is really the case. Given that most individuals 
with WS reach a non-verbal mental age of between 5 and 7 years, it is not surprising that they 
are able to comprehend core syntactic and semantic relations (Musolino et al. 2010). These 
relations are expected to have been acquired by typically developing children by 5 years of 
age. Hence, there is no compelling evidence for clear dissociations between general cognitive 
abilities and language.  
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Although not as rich, evidence from DS is still very informative. This evidence leads to a 
different conclusion in the theoretical debate between innate modularity and 
neuroconstructivism. So far, research has shown that linguistic abilities in DS often lag 
behind non-verbal abilities. In particular, morphosyntactic skills and, in some individuals, 
vocabulary knowledge seem to be poorer than expected given non-verbal mental age. Such 
findings suggest that linguistic abilities may not be fully dependent upon non-verbal 
functioning, otherwise one would not expect to find language skills which are below a 
person’s general level of cognitive functioning. It seems that in individuals with DS (although 
there are a few exceptions), non-verbal cognitive ability does not necessarily interact with 
language in the same way as it appears to in individuals with WS. This leads to the 
conclusion that perhaps language skills (or at least some language skills) do develop 
independently of other cognitive abilities, as the innate modularity hypothesis would suggest. 
 
Interestingly, it has been research into WS rather than DS which has been referred to as the 
prototypical example of a dissociation between linguistic and non-verbal abilities in 
theoretical debates on innate modularity. However, the literature review above suggests that 
there may also be a dissociation between linguistic and non-verbal skills in DS. 
Unfortunately, linguistic abilities in DS have not received the detailed investigation, scrutiny 
and analyses needed in order to assess the magnitude of possible associations or dissociations 
between linguistic and non-verbal functioning. In addition, there have not been many studies 
which have adopted a developmental trajectory approach in order to explain the delay in 
language and other cognitive abilities often reported in individuals with DS. If it turns out 
that the developmental trajectory of language and other cognitive abilities is atypical in DS 
and that there are no clear dissociations between language and non-verbal cognitive abilities, 
one could argue that DS provides evidence for the neuroconstructivist view.  
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Despite the fact that research into developmental disorders over the past few decades has not 
resolved the theoretical debate between nativism and constructivism, the fields of language 
acquisition, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience have gained much from 
this research. For example, we now have a much more comprehensive understanding of the 
complexities of developmental disorders, in particular Williams syndrome and, to some 
extent, Down’s syndrome. The evidence from these two disorders (at least what we have so 
far) does not exclusively support one or the other theoretical viewpoint. It would be fair to 
say that research into WS and DS has been driving the development of new thinking about 
how the theoretical frameworks we are currently working with may need to be modified. For 
example, based on a detailed overview of the language acquisition literature on inflectional 
morphology and with reference to the two competing theories (nativism and constructivism), 
Ambridge and Lieven (2011: 190) conclude that if nativist-generativist accounts of language 
acquisition could explain early errors reported in child language, and if constructivist 
accounts could explain how the adult state of language knowledge is reached, ‘the field 
would be able to move closer to a complete understanding of the domain of inflectional 
morphology’.  
 
In a similar manner, given that developmental disorders such as WS and DS provide evidence 
for both theoretical viewpoints, it seems that a more unified account is needed. This would 
bring the two views together so that instead of opposing each other, they would complement 
each other. For example, it is true that a number of cognitive skills in WS develop atypically 
and that there are no strong language and non-verbal dissociations in children with WS. Yet, 
there are dissociations found in the adult state. It seems that the neuroconstructivist view is 
focusing exclusively on development whereas the nativist view is focusing on the end state. 
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However, both these viewpoints are crucial for the ultimate understanding of human 
cognitive architecture, and they need to be viewed in synergy with each other in order to have 
the optimum explanatory power. In this respect, research into developmental disorders may 
lead the way to a more unified theoretical framework. Such a framework will have the power 
to explain developmental and end-state cognitive patterns reported not only for WS and DS 
but developmental disorders in general.  
 
29.6 Directions for future research 
What is particularly lacking in our present knowledge base are investigations of early 
linguistic and non-verbal skills in WS and DS. There have been only a small number of 
studies of infants with WS and DS. Mundy et al. (1995) identified non-verbal requesting as a 
possible predictor of expressive language in DS. However, although this study was 
longitudinal in nature, it did not go beyond the age of 36 months. This is the age at which 
many children with DS would still be in the holophrastic stage of language acquisition. 
Hence, it is impossible to know how language development proceeds beyond this age. Laing 
et al. (2002) investigated early language development in infants with WS, also in the context 
of how well early social communication skills predict language outcomes. The study does not 
provide a longitudinal examination of language skills per se, so we do not know how 
linguistic skills unfold over time in the first few years of life. 
 
However, an interesting finding emerged from Laing et al.’s study. These investigators found 
that pointing may not necessarily precede the onset of first words in WS as it does in 
typically developing children. The question arises as to whether an atypical trajectory of 
development, as evidenced from behavioural studies, means by default that modules are not 
specified for certain cognitive functions from birth. Unless behavioural studies are 
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complemented by neurophysiological investigations, it will be very difficult to move forward 
the innate modularity debate. Our current state of knowledge would also benefit from 
carefully constructed, longitudinal studies including both behavioural and neurophysiological 
measures. These studies should examine in detail the acquisition of linguistic abilities as well 
as non-verbal skills in children with DS and WS from the onset of the two-word stage until 
about 10 years of age.  
 
It goes without saying that the linguistic and general cognitive profiles of individuals with 
WS and DS are the result of brain development which occurs under certain genetic 
constraints. Given technological advances in cognitive neuroscience, and in particular the 
availability of a range of neurophysiological measures such as magnetic resonance imaging 
and electroencephalography, future research has the potential to explain the 
neurophysiological bases of resulting phenotypes. Possible neural localisation and 
impenetrability of different ‘modules’ from infancy would directly address the issue of innate 
modularity. Studies using event related potentials (ERPs) have shown that individuals with 
WS do not develop the hemispheric asymmetries associated with the processing of closed 
versus open class words by individuals in the general population (Neville et al. 1994). This 
suggests that the neural organisation of some aspects of language in WS may be different 
from that of the general population. However, we still do not know exactly what this means 
in terms of whether modules are innately specified or are a product of development. ERP 
studies of infants with WS would help address this issue.  
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